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# DEMOCRATIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A DIPLOMATIC MODEL

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## **ABSTRACT**

Accusations of the democratic inadequacy of global governance institutions are hardly novel and have prevailed with increasing intensity since the turn of the millennium. The questions of why, and perhaps more importantly, how, democratic principles should be applied to the practice of global governance have similarly become staple in the existing literature. This has been in response to the increasing impact the actions of governance institutions have on a global citizenry that is significantly and unquestionably removed from the relevant decision-making processes. However, the majority of propositions for democratization at the supra-state level tend to be revolutionary in that they hinge upon a fundamental alteration of existing governance institutions and/or pay scant attention to the individuals who actually participate in their attendant processes. This article attempts to surmount these two challenges by proposing a model of democratic global governance that simultaneously aims to work within, as opposed to against, the present system, and pays particular attention to the role of diplomats in this democratization. Utilizing a combination of cosmopolitan and deliberative democratic theories, as well as a reformulated understanding of the practice of diplomacy, the proposed model encapsulates a possible path for the democratization of global governance through its implementation in particular issue areas/governance regimes as they relate to specific communal goals.

Keywords: global governance, cosmopolitan democracy, deliberative democracy, civil society, diplomacy

## **INTRODUCTION**

The concept of democracy is widely understood to have limited applicability to inter-state governance. However, the “increasing capacity of international governance regimes to generate law and regulations binding all citizens has come to conflict with this problem of democratic legitimacy” (Nanz & Steffek 2004, p. 314), thereby highlighting the need for democratization on the supra-state level.

Many scholars have dealt specifically with the issue of applying democratic principles to global governance and have proposed a number of ways to do just that, such as cosmopolitan democracy (see Archibugi, 2008). Thus far, however, the majority of such propositions tend to be revolutionary; they typically involve a fundamental alteration of the international system as we know it and its replacement (partial or total) by another governance model. Furthermore, a number of these propositions tend to focus on existing governance institutions without paying attention to the individuals who actually participate in their constitutive decision-making processes and how they could be made more representative – and thus more democratic.

This article aims to surmount the limitations inherent to these two prevalent directions in the field by proposing a

model of democratic global governance that i) aims to work within, as opposed to against, the present system; and ii) pays particular attention to the role of diplomats in this democratization. The remainder of the article is divided into six sections. In the first section, I provide a brief review of the literature on governance (practice and institutions) and the democratic deficit, followed by a characterization of the interplay between diplomatic practise and the democratic deficit. In the third section, I lay the groundwork for the proposed model, the details of which are expounded in the fourth section. The fifth section offers some comments regarding the feasibility of the proposed model, while the final section offers some concluding remarks.

### ***THE CONTEXT***

van Assche et al. (2015) define governance as “the taking of collectively binding decisions for a community, in a community, by governmental actors”; it is a process involving a variety of actors in shifting relationships, numerous formal and informal institutions, and various forms of knowledge and expertise (p. 20). Such decision-making practices share three characteristic features: they are concerned with publicly-oriented goals; intentionally steer society towards these goals; and are authoritative in that they rest on mutual recognition between the governed and the governor (Andonova et al. 2009, pp. 55-56). Overall, therefore, governance involves a variety of authoritative actors (state and non-state) taking collectively binding decisions towards communal goals within the context of shared networks/institutions in a process that is different from, and even more encompassing than government.

Consequently, global governance can easily be understood to mean governance on a global level. Rosenau (1995, p. 14) understands it to involve the coordination

of states and the activities of a variety of rule systems, beyond institutions and organizations and at every level of human activity in the pursuit of goals, policies, and directives outside national boundaries. In the same vein, van Doeveren (2011) defines it as referring to a decision-making process whereby “sovereignty is dispersed among governmental and nongovernmental actors” such that the governing process itself “cannot be controlled from the centre” (p. 302). Summarily, global governance is not simply reducible to state activity or a state-based ontology as it involves – in addition to states and intergovernmental organizations – corporations, civil-society, scientific networks and a host of other actors in the handling of their collective, and often overlapping, affairs (Dodds 2016, p. 98).

According to Karns & Mingst (2004), global governance consists of four pieces: international law, norms (soft law), formal and informal structures, and international regimes (see p. 5). Of all these, international organizations (formal structures) are easily the most important aspect of global governance due to their state membership, Moravcsik (2004) even describes global governance as simply the “structure of international institutions” (p. 336). The reason for the relatively greater importance of international organizations for global governance is easily discernible and intrinsic to their very nature. International organizations are organizations consisting of at least three member-states bound by a formal, legal agreement, with activities spanning several states. As such, these organizations remain particularly relevant for global governance due to their state membership, despite the increasing capacity of non-state actors to influence governance activities. International organizations come in a variety of forms and are distinguishable based on their scope – specializing in one issue-area,

such as the International Labour Organization, or general, as in the case of the United Nations – and their geographical reach – sub-regional (e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council), regional (e.g. the African Union), or global (e.g. the World Trade Organization). Such global international organizations are of particular concern here: their state membership means that they are uniquely able to make governance decisions that affect a community of near-global membership. The definition of governance offered earlier could be modified to refer to international organizations as decision-making institutions of governance through which authoritative state actors take collectively binding decisions towards communal goals.

### **The Democratic Deficit in International Organizations**

International organizations have frequently been accused of being undemocratic. The consensus appears to be that they indeed suffer from a democratic deficit (Majone, 1998; Bekkers et al., 2007). The rationale behind this assessment is that these organizations are increasingly functioning and taking decisions without the involvement of the very community or civil societies upon which these decisions are binding, and thus, are at least entitled to a say in those decisions (Goodin 2010, p. 178). Furthermore, due to the increasing policy scope of international organizations – which now covers almost every policy area from security to marine life – the decisions taken at such fora occasionally entail repercussions for polities who were either outvoted during the decision-making process or are altogether unrepresented in such organizations.

Before venturing further into the nature and manifestation of the democratic deficit in international organizations, it is imperative that I first elucidate what exactly is referred to by the term

‘democratic deficit’. As Levinson (2007) succinctly put it, a democratic deficit can be said to exist “when ostensibly democratic organizations or institutions in fact fall short of fulfilling what are believed to be the principles of democracy.” (p. 860; emphasis added). International organizations, therefore, suffer from a democratic deficit because they do not satisfy the principles of democratic governance. The emphasis on the word ‘ostensibly’ in Levinson’s definition is to highlight the importance of two interrelated normative questions: one of whether or not we should expect international organizations to be democratic (because they claim to be so) and another of whether or not they simply should be.

The first of these two questions is easily answered. Apart from the unique – and I dare say incongruous – case of the European Union, no other international organization, least of all one of a global character, claims to be democratic in the conventional understanding of the term. The reality seems to be as Dahl (1999) believes it to be: international organizations are inherently incapable of supporting direct democratic processes and decision-making due to the large geographical areas they encompass. Again, however, it is worth mentioning the case of the European Parliament whereby citizens of the European Union’s member states directly elect their representatives calls such a conclusion into question (although this is not to suggest that such a process can easily be applied to all other international organizations, nor that it should be). Summarily, therefore, the answer to the question of whether or not we should expect international organizations, on the whole, to be democratic because they claim to be so is simple, no!

In regards to the second question: should international organizations aspire to be democratic? If we believe that the

polities who would be affected by the decisions taken at such bodies should be included in the decision-making process(es) to some degree, then the logical answer is yes. Furthermore, once we accept that international organizations ought to aspire to satisfy as many democratic qualifications as they can, we can reasonably accept the notion that they do indeed suffer from a democratic deficit. This deficit manifests itself – and I contend is dually engendered – by several factors, including: insufficient public participation, opaque and technocratic decision-making, excessive reliance on administrative discretion, and insufficiently organized means of control and accountability (Majone 1998, pp. 14-15). Interestingly, these factors tend to be mutually reinforcing in practice. For example, the lack of systems of accountability for international organizations might lead them to inordinately rely on administrative discretion in decision-making, which itself only further alienates the public from the decision-making process.

I find it necessary to mention at this juncture that the belief that international organizations are undemocratic hardly enjoys a ubiquitous consensus. Moravcsik (2004) argues that those who conclude that international institutions suffer from a democratic deficit are wrong in that their assessment is based on utopian and idealistic conceptions of democracy. An idealist conception of democracy must be calibrated to assess its feasibility given real-life circumstances. Adopting “reasonable normative and empirical criteria for evaluating democracy” reveals that accusations of a democratic deficit are not so clear-cut (p. 337), an exercise that he carries out using the case of the European Union. Moravcsik’s argument, therefore, is that international organizations should not be compared to idealized imaginary political systems but the imperfect real-world governments

acting within the context of complex constraints.

Regardless, international organizations are still widely believed to suffer from a democratic deficit, an ailment they are unlikely to resolve of their own accord; thus, the required reforms need to constitute conscious and attainable objectives (Zweifel 2006, p. 176). This leads us to the question of what forms these reforms should take – how can we reform the conduct of international organizations, and implicitly global governance, to make it more democratic? It is this question that the present study aims to answer in the form of a proposal for democratic governance. Before attempting to address what form such reforms should take, however, it is necessary to first outline the relationship between the current democratic deficit in global governance and the practice of diplomacy.

### **Diplomacy and the Democratic Deficit in Global Governance**

As with democracy, the practice of diplomacy rests on a single precept: representation (Barston 1997, p. 2). How diplomats perform this central task through their participation in the decision-making processes of international organizations and other global governance mechanisms contributes to their impact on the democratic deficit. So, given the present state of diplomatic practice, do diplomats further or mitigate the democratic deficit?

The general belief is that a diplomat’s representation of society is indirect and implicit insofar as the government from which (s)he received their mandate itself represents society (obviously truer for democratic systems than for other political systems). A counter-argument has been made, however, that diplomats do not represent society but the government, even when they hail from democratically-elected governments, because they act as

secretive clubs – they are simply unelected actors who take decisions in closed-off gatherings (Moravcsik 2010, p. 13). As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the present form of diplomatic practise does little in the way of mitigating the diplomatic deficit. As Majone (1998) opines, diplomats are granted considerable discretion in their articulation of governmental interests in these organizations who enjoy “important policy-making powers...[and] by design are not directly accountable to the voters or to their elected representatives” (p. 15). What results is a reality of diplomacy dominated by a technocratic conception of democracy whereby citizens are not included in decision-making (Crowley & Giorgi 2006, p. 2).

This reality, or more specifically, its correction, leads us to back the question of how can global governance and the practice of diplomacy within it be made more democratic?

#### Laying the Foundation: A Diplomatic Model of Democratic Global Governance

The model outlined below aims to democratize global governance by working within the present structure while simultaneously giving diplomats a greater role in the process. It is based on a combination of two democratic theories – cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi, 2008) and deliberative democracy (Bohman & Rehg, 1997) – and a reformulated understanding of diplomacy, particularly in terms of who is understood to be a diplomat.

### ***COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY***

The theory of cosmopolitan democracy is a normative project that seeks to apply some of the democratic principles, values, and procedures responsible for the success of democratization efforts within the state at the global level (Archibugi, 2004; 2008;

2012; Archibugi & Held, 2011). The theory is based on the observation that while states remain de jure sovereign, they are de facto non-autonomous (Archibugi 2012, p. 10). The reality is simply that it is increasingly impossible for states to meaningfully conduct democratic decision-making to the extent that each has to cope with occurrences outside of it, over which it has no control.

This strand of theory is unique in that although its primary objective is the democratization of global governance, there is a similar emphasis on the need for democratization at the local, national, transnational, and regional levels, to promote nonviolence, political equality, and popular control (Archibugi 2008, p. 27; see also Archibugi, 2004).

Archibugi & Held (2011) outline what they term the 'paths towards cosmopolitan democracy', which are transitional steps towards its realization. These include: the advent of cosmopolitan states, which provide equal treatment for their citizens and aliens, as well as respect the rights of their minorities; a change in national foreign policy objectives towards the respect for international norms, participation in international organizations, the provision of global public goods, and support of democratization efforts; the reform of international organizations to embrace some democratic principles; the use of global judicial authorities to ensure the rule of law; and the emergence boundary-less deliberative political communities (pp. 441-447).

While all of these paths are undoubtedly integral to the realization of democracy on the global level, of particular importance to the model being proposed are the reform of international organizations and the emergence of boundary-less deliberative communities. Additionally, the cosmopolitan democratic emphasis on the need for democratization at all governance

levels is also of some importance to the proposed model.

## ***DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY***

Deliberative democracy is a mode of democratic governance in which the primary decision-making mechanism is consensus-building through reflective public reasoning in the form of authentic deliberation – authentic to the extent that it is free from “the distortions of power and big money” (Leib 2006, p. 906). Such an approach places communication at the core of politics (Ercan & Dryzek 2015, p. 241) and it has been argued that not only are deliberative processes able to resolve the supposed trade-off between democracy and governance efficiency, but they might also increase the efficiency of governance networks (Anderson & Loftager, 2014). While proponents of deliberative democracy agree on the importance of deliberation, they often take different positions on its particularities.

Hendriks (2006) offers a typology of two divergent streams of deliberative democratic theory, differentiated by the role they each ascribe to civil society. Micro deliberative theory ascribes a limited role for civil society in deliberative processes to the extent that it is “willing and capable of participating in structured deliberative fora...[and] take on communicative forms of action through collaborating with the state”. Conversely, macro deliberative theory emphasizes the informal and unstructured forms of deliberation that occur in the public sphere and envisions a more active civil society “in informal political activities both outside and against the state...[combining] both communicative and strategic behaviour” (p. 487). Hendriks herself is in favour of a more inclusive democratic theory that integrates both micro and macro strands of deliberation.

Similarly, but also simultaneously dissimilarly, Leib (2006) distinguishes

between elitist and populist deliberative democracy. Elitist deliberative democracy limits deliberative activity to political elites. Conversely, populist deliberative democracy sees the benefits of deliberation as best being realised if it occurs between lay citizens (p. 913).

One final theoretical dichotomy is worth mentioning; this concerns the role of emotion in the deliberative process. Ryfe (2002) distinguishes between rational and relational modes of deliberation. In the first, deliberation is expected to be modelled on scientific empiricism – claims are advanced, substantiated through supporting evidence, and counterfactual information is considered. Such a scientific process leaves little room for emotion. In contrast, relational modes of deliberation believe that the inclusion of emotion in deliberation is important as it helps guarantee participation and is more likely to lead to consensus when this requires parties to act contrary to their interests. Furthermore, emotion allows for appeals to common values and stresses the importance of equality and consensus in spite of difference (pp. 359-360).

The proposed model borrows the following propositions from deliberative democratic theory as outlined above: an emphasis on the importance of deliberation for democratic governance and a refocus of democracy towards consensus building as opposed to majority rule in decision-making. Furthermore, the deliberative element of the model is characterized by the amalgamation of micro and macro, elitist and populist, and rational and relational deliberative democracy. The result is an overall deliberative process that is simultaneously formal and informal, conducted by both elites and lay citizens, and contains both empirical and emotional appeals.

## **A NEW (CIVIL-SOCIETY) DIPLOMACY**

While diplomacy is conventionally understood to be the purview of representatives of state interests, technological advancements in the fields of communication and transportation have modified and reshaped the practice of diplomacy (Harmen 1971, p. 55) such that it is no longer considered to be a purely state-based activity.

According to Cooper (2004), the emergent new diplomacy allows for “a greater balance of authority to take shape”, a balance reinforced by “the multilateral bias in equilibrating activity”, which creates opportunities for non-state actors to take advantage of it (p. 7). One such non-state actor is the increasingly real global civil society, which Lipschutz (1992) defines as “self-conscious constitutions of networks of knowledge and action by decentred local actors, that cross the refined boundaries of space as though they were not there” (cited in Cameron 1999, p. 85).

According to Salamon et al. (1999), the proliferation of transnational civil society organizations is emblematic of a “global associational revolution”. In addition to the advancements in communication that have similarly altered the practice of diplomacy, this proliferation is also explained by an expanding global middle-class lacking the means for political and economic expression (p. 4).

As states found a means of expression through diplomats, so also does this emergent global civil society need diplomats of its own to express (represent) its interests, thus necessitating the need for a new diplomacy cast in such terms. This alone, however, is insufficient justification for the need for civil society diplomats – as they could arguably find other means of expressing their interests. The necessity of a new diplomacy is apparent not just in a

need for civil society to express its interests, but also in the realization that the inclusion of civil society actors in global governance processes is vital for any attempt at its democratization. What is needed is a post-Westphalian understanding of diplomacy that is open to its manifestation in other non-state-based forms.

The proposed model departs from such a foundation: its diplomatic element fuses two categories of diplomats. On the one hand, the place of conventional state diplomats in global governance is maintained, while on the other hand, it adds a novel category of diplomats who represent societal (as opposed to state) interests, each with similar patterns of directive giving – from state foreign policy apparatus' and civil society organizations respectively.

It was noted earlier that one criticism of conventional diplomatic practice is that diplomats do not interact with society, and consequently, cannot be said to represent societal interests in any meaningful way. The inclusion of this new category of diplomats in this model equally serves to surmount this criticism. To reiterate, the new diplomacy here includes both diplomats who represent state interests and those that represent the interests of civil society

### ***THE PROPOSED MODEL***

The model proposed in the figure below aims to resolve the democratic deficiency of global governance with respect to popular control, accountability, political equality and representation, as explained earlier.

Figure 1 – A model for democratizing global governance

Central to this model is the belief, borrowed from cosmopolitan democracy,



that democratizing global governance requires the practice of democracy at all other levels of governance. This is especially true for the function of the proposed model, which depends on deliberative practices on two supra-state levels. Deliberation on each level is expected to yield two different, albeit related, outcomes and entails participants justifying their positions, pursuing reciprocal understanding with those from whom their framework or ideology differs, placing value on inclusion and reflection, and repudiating coercive or deceptive language (Ercan & Dryzek 2015, p. 241).

First, the model envisions a populist, relational, and generally unstructured (macro) mode of transnational deliberation between the peoples of different states – that is, the mass publics consisting of lay citizens. Due to the spatial stretch envisioned, this would need to be facilitated by new internet-based communication technologies which would enable publics from different states to engage in simultaneous deliberation (see Sideridis et al., 2014). It is immediately apparent that deliberation at such a level might prove impossible even in light of present technologies: one can hardly envision an unstructured deliberative forum comprising a transnational membership of even just one billion people as being productive.

This challenge is cautiously surmounted by the recognition that prior to the 20th century, invitations to multilateral conferences were only extended to states with a direct interest in the matter (Berridge 1995, p. 65). In the same manner, participation in deliberation is contingent upon the participant having a direct interest in the matter at hand, thus significantly limiting the number of participants. Furthermore, as noted by Mpoitsis & Koutsoupas (2014), only individuals with an interest in politics are expected to participate. (Un)fortunately, contemporary politics is such that this

number is less than ideal, ipso facto reducing the number of deliberative participants. Despite this, the success of deliberation at this level is dependent on the guarantee of the political equality of all citizens in both national constitutions and international legal instruments. The goal of deliberation here is to elucidate the dominant interests of the transnational societal groups that constitute the global civil society. It is these interests that are then passed on up the governance ladder to their representatives.

The second level of deliberation is more global and operates on a genuinely more supra-state level. Deliberation here is expected to be more elitist, rational, and structured (micro). The primary participants here are the two categories of diplomats outlined earlier: state and civil society representatives. It is important to note here that, unlike the state representatives who may choose to participate in the previous deliberations outlined above, the participation of civil society representatives is mandatory as their interaction with society is a prerequisite for any claim to be representing its interests. Regardless, both groups of diplomats are expected to engage in productive deliberation to the end of reaching a consensual decision on the issue at hand. Three further points are worth mentioning in relation to this second stage of deliberation.

First, this deliberation must occur in actual institutionalized settings – such as a reformed United Nations General Assembly or parallel citizen assemblies of the sort proposed by Archibugi & Held (2011, p. 446) – to ensure that i) the decisions taken through such consensus-based decision-making are indeed actionable and will be acted upon, and ii) to provide an object of accountability. Second, both categories of diplomats are expected to interact with the public to some degree through social media and other similar avenues; this is necessary to

ensure that they are at the very least somewhat apprised of societal trends, debates, and 'hot topics'. Lastly, the door must be left open for the participation (even if limited to just observation) of informal civil society representatives. Their goal is to act as watchdogs by ensuring that societal interests are indeed being represented at deliberative fora.

### ***SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS***

Outlined above is a coherent, though nonetheless skeletal, outline of the proposed model. Some additional remarks, however, are necessary to provide a clearer picture as to the particularities of its operation.

First, as the emphasis consensus-forming on particular issues no doubt betrays, the proposed model is not intended to be applied as a general mode of conducting the business of global governance. Rather, it is intended for use regarding particular issue areas as these pertain to specific communal goals.

Second, the model is intended to provide a means of making global governance more democratic by enhancing the popular control of the people, accountability of governance bodies to the people, political equality and representation of the people. Who, however, is 'the people'? Put differently, how do we define the subject of the aforementioned democratization? My understanding here of 'the people' is derived from one of three Aristotelean types of citizens posited by Shuifa & Jinglei (2008) – 'the people' who are the object of democratic governance and are thus represented by governance processes are those who actually participate in governance activities.

Third, the model posits a need for institutionalizing deliberation as a means to provide an object of accountability for 'the people'. This is especially important

as accountability primarily expands and hardly ever contracts (Goodin 2010, p. 188). As such, institutionalizing forms of democratic governance accountable to civil society is immensely important. Particularly so, because though initially intended to be limited to reason-giving, such accountability can extend its bounds and take on newer and even more democratic forms. Also, important for accountability is the transparency of all deliberative processes to ensure that the question of 'who said what' is always easily answered (Norris 1997, p. 275). On a concluding note, it is interesting that the process of deliberation itself is one of accountability as it requires – and even depends on – reason-giving.

#### **The Feasibility of the Proposed Model**

In the previous section, I outlined a model of democratic global governance primarily based on a two-stage deliberative process – one between politically conscious lay citizens willing to participate in politics, and another between state representatives and a new category of diplomats representing civil society. The focus of this section is twofold: first, it offers a discussion as to the practicality of the proposed model based on current realities and trends; and second, it offers an attempt at 'measuring' the 'democraticness' of the proposed model dependent on its basis for representation.

#### **How Practical is the Proposed Model?**

Falk (2009) speaks of horizons of necessity, desire, and feasibility concerning the need for democratizing global governance. Of particular concern to us here are horizons of feasibility, which refer to "policy goals attainable without substantial modification of structures of power, privilege, authority, and societal belief patterns...[which] can shift abruptly during moments of crisis and emergency (p. 14). Such an

understanding forms the basis for an answer to the question – is the proposed model feasible?

First off, the answer is a qualified positive. It is positive because it does not aim to modify any of the structures outlined in a substantial sense but merely seeks to reform them in ways through which they could become more democratic. To the extent that it does entail policy changes that could be touted as substantial, however, such a yes is qualified. Furthermore, the qualification should be taken in light of the fact that the structures outlined are undergoing significant shifts in this historical moment of crisis – the rise of populism and civil unrest in the West, the global resurgence of nationalism, xenophobic trends, and the increasing fragility of the liberal world order all point to a ‘moment of crisis’ (see Walt, 2016; Ferguson & Zakaria, 2017; Foreign Affairs, 2017).

Such a crisis brings hitherto utopian propositions such as this into the realm of feasibility, feasibility only rendered more plausible by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been impactful enough to encourage discussions of how the global community might cease upon the opportunity for reform and direct efforts into improving different aspects of the human condition (see Fukuyama, 2020; Huang, 2021).

Furthermore, the practicality of the proposed model is enhanced in that it does not seek to overhaul the present global governance systems, but to reform it; primarily by including deliberation as a guiding democratic principle and by establishing parallel organizations more closely linked to civil society.

### **How Democratic is the Proposed Model?**

In determining how democratic a decision-making process has been, there is a need to distinguish between input and

output democracy. Input democracy concerns the guarantee of democratic rights of participation to all citizens, while output democracy concerns the extent to which the decision taken is representative of the collective interest (Koenig-Archibugi 2011 p. 527; Bellamy 2010, p. 3).

The proposed model performs well in both terms. On the one hand, its emphasis on a legal provision of political equality and providing an avenue for all citizens to participate (in the first level of deliberation) satisfies the requirement of input democracy to the extent that these two provisions provide ample means for all individuals to ensure their individual preference is included in the governance process. On the other hand, the model’s deliberative element serves to ensure that the outputs are indeed representative of the collective interest.

The proposed model equally satisfies the two democratic attributes proposed by Dahl (1971) – competition and inclusion – as its deliberative emphasis guarantees that there is both a contestation of interests and participation. Overall, the proposed model does indeed appear to be substantively democratic.

### **CONCLUSION**

This article offers a contribution to the literature on the democratization of global governance. Global governance institutions, particularly international organizations have been found lacking in terms of democratic credentials. This shortcoming, through worrisome in and of itself given the growing impact of such organizations, is further aggravated by the conventional practice of diplomacy. In their zest to represent state interests, as opposed to those more generically traceable to society at large, diplomats appear to further this deficit to the extent that their activities in international organizations ultimately fall short in

respect to one of (if not the single) the shared principles underlying the concepts of both diplomacy and democracy.

Based on this reality, the article outlines a preliminary sketch of a proposal for democratizing global governance founded primarily on a cosmopolitan understanding of democracy and the utilization of deliberation on two levels – between politically participant citizens, and state and civil society representatives – and diplomatic practice. I have also shown that the proposed model could serve as a valuable means of making global governance processes more representative and accountable, implicitly mitigating the democratic deficit by facilitating the upward mobility of aggregated societal interests.

In principle, the model requires democratic government at the state and sub-state levels; to the extent that this is a necessary prerequisite for the identification of broader societal interests at the base before they are subsequently aggregated upwards. In practice, it involves two forms of deliberation: mass deliberation of members of transnational civil society, with the only barrier to participation being that the prospective participants have a direct interest in the (specific) issue at hand; and a much more elitist deliberation after the fact in which diplomats (state and civil) engage in a much more structured, practical discussion based on the latter with a view towards consensus-building.

Further study is needed, however, to better ground the model and address its potential criticisms, which admittedly, were not given sufficient attention here. There is also a further need to explore the democraticness of the model using suitable democratic measures. Taken together, the results of these and other similar research directions would serve to lead to an even more democratic global governance.

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